This paper addresses a key question which is whether the recent global financial crisis play any role in changing the state of the foreign exchange market efficiency in both developed and developing markets. This study has demonstrated that both developed and developing foreign exchange markets are mostly efficient during periods of low volatility. Conversely, only developing markets tend to be generally inefficient during periods of high volatility as evidenced by the rejection of the random walk hypothesis and the evidence of profitability of technical trading rules, whereas developing market efficiency hold when tested in the context of the forward unbiasedness hypothesis framework.
Introduction
For many years, foreign exchange market efficiency has been a source of continuing controversy in the international finance circles. Like most hypotheses in finance and economics, the evidence on the Efficient Market Hypothesis is mixed. Some studies have supported the hypothesis and indicate that capital markets are efficient, while other studies have raised questions about support for it. The literature on the foreign exchange market efficiency suggests different versions of market efficiency, based on the notion that Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) relies on the efficient exploitation of information by economic actors. For example, foreign exchange market efficiency hypothesis is referred as the forward unbiasedness hypothesis (FUH) which is considered the benchmark for testing efficiency in the foreign exchange markets. In an efficient market, the forward exchange rate for delivery at a specified future date should be an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate. Foreign exchange market efficiency hypothesis is also called the random walk hypothesis, which says that successive price changes are serially uncorrelated and occur randomly. Exchange rate markets are efficient if and only if the returns of the currencies are random and thus not predictable. Another version of the foreign exchange market efficiency is referred as Informational Efficiency (Fama, 1984, Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994) , which states that a foreign exchange market is efficient if it fully reflects all historical information, and therefore, it should not be possible to profit by trading on the information contained in the foreign exchange rate history.
The key question in this paper is whether periods of high volatility play any role in changing the state of the foreign exchange market efficiency in both developed and developing markets. To address this question, my goal is to examine the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the foreign exchange developed and developing markets efficiency, defined at a broader case that includes three versions of the weak-form market efficiency. In particular, I investigate the following three properties of foreign exchange market efficiency (1) the existence of correlation and cointegrating vector between the forward rates and the corresponding spot rates, as implied by the forward unbiasedness hypothesis; (2) the randomness of foreign exchange series, as predicted by the serial correlation version of the random walk hypothesis; and (3) no technical trading rule generates statistically significant abnormal returns, as implied by the informational efficiency hypothesis. All these versions of the EMH imply numerous test procedures for examining the efficiency hypothesis. The correlation between spot and forward rates through running Johansen Cointegration test and the traditional Fama regression using bilateral exchange rates, pooled analysis, and portfolio analysis. The random walk version is examined using unit root tests and variance ratio tests. Finally, the informational efficiency version is tested by examining the profitability of three common technical trading rules in the FX market, namely, simple moving averages (MA) indicator, momentum (MOM) oscillator, and relative strength index (RSI).
The primary motivation of the present paper is that, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to compare the relative response of developed and developing foreign exchange markets efficiency, measured using three different measures of efficiency, to the recent financial crisis. The closest in this respect is the work by Ahmad, Rhee, Wong (2012) which covered only selected Asian countries and they also did not examine the profitability of technical trading rules which is of interest here in this study.
The main finding of the paper can be summarized as follows. During periods of "booms", the foreign exchange markets (both developed and developing) are mostly efficient. When the market conditions deteriorate, however, only developing markets tend to be generally inefficient as evidenced by both the rejection of the random walk hypothesis and the evidence of profitability of technical trading rules, whereas developing market efficiency hold when tested in the context of the forward unbiasedness hypothesis framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Data and variables are set forth in section 3. Section 4 shows the empirical results of testing the forward unbiasedness hypothesis.
Section 5 presents the empirical procedures and results for testing the random walk hypothesis.
Section 6 examined the profitability of technical trading rules. Section 7 concludes.
Data and Sample Periods
Our raw currency dataset consists of daily observations for spot exchange rates and one month forward exchange rates. As we consider the point of view of a risk-averse US resident, we follow standard convention in the exchange rate literature and take the US Dollar to be the home currency, so that all foreign currencies are priced in US Dollars, i.e., the exchange rate of a foreign country is denominated in units of foreign currency per one US dollar (FCU/USD). All spot and forward exchange rates are obtained from DataStream, with Reuters as the underlying source. The empirical analysis is carried out at the daily frequency. I abstract from transaction costs and use spot and forward rates that are the average of the bid and ask rates. Table 1 highlights some descriptive statistics of each currency separately. Table 1 presents the daily average means for the forward premium and the daily average appreciation/depreciation against USD for each of the currencies in the sample over the sample period, along with, their exchange rate return in excess of the prediction by UIP (i.e., the abnormal return) as well as the number of observations for each respective currency.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Over the entire sample period, the Japanese Yen (+0.09% on average) has the best performance among the developed countries sample, and the South African rand (+0.18% on average) and Czech koruna (+0.16% on average) have the best performance among the developing countries sample. Notably, the Egyptian pound (-0.10% on average) and the Singapore Dollar (-0.10% on average) have the worst performance among the currencies of developing countries.
The overall results for exchange rate changes show that most of the foreign currencies appreciated against the USD during the pre-crisis period when global markets were booming and during the post-crisis period when global markets were recovering. Conversely, most of the foreign currencies depreciated against the USD during the crisis period. Our results in Panel A show that all our sample of ten developed currencies (except JPY) appreciated against the USD during the pre-crisis sample period (0.03% on average). Strikingly, all these nine currencies (except Swiss franc) suddenly depreciated against the USD during the crisis. The recovery period is characterized by a renewal of gains of six currencies (AUS, CAD, NZD, NOK, SEK, GBP). The daily average FX returns for our pool of developed countries are positive (0.03% on average) during the precrisis period; negative (-0.02% on average) during the crisis period; and positive (0.02% on average) during the post-crisis period. A similar pattern is observed for our sample of developing countries in Panel B. Eleven currencies in our developing sample (BRL, HUF, INR, MYR, PHP, PLN, PTE/EUR, RUB, ZAR, THB, TRY) appreciated against the USD during the pre-crisis sample, and then depreciated over the crisis period. Returns rallied for all these 11 currencies during the post-crisis period. The daily average FX returns for our pool of developing countries are positive (0.01% on average) during the pre-crisis period; negative (-0.03% on average) during the crisis period; and positive (0.02% on average) during the post-crisis period.
Efficiency Test (1): The Unbiased Predictor Hypothesis
The forward unbiasedness hypothesis (FUH) is considered the benchmark for testing efficiency in the foreign exchange markets, because in an efficient market the forward exchange rate for delivery at a specified future date should be an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate, as follows
where denotes the nominal spot exchange rate, and denotes the forward exchange rate. All exchange rates are defined with respect to the U.S. dollar, measured as the number of units of the foreign currency for one dollar. An increase in spot exchange rate means an appreciation of the U.S. dollar. I examine the FUH using two tests (1) 'Fama regression' which is regressing spot rate changes on forward premium; and (2) 'Cointegration tests'. Market efficiency implies a significant coefficient of regressing spot rate changes on the forward premium in 'Fama regression' and evidence of cointegrating vector between spot rate and the corresponding forward rate.
Fama Regression
Fama regression is the standard test for the FX market efficiency in the literature (e.g., Fama, 1984; Froot and Thaler, 1990; Bollerslev, 1989, 2000; Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000; Frankel and Poonawala, 2010; Ahmad, Rhee, Wong, 2012) , and can be stated as follows
I denote as the logarithm of the nominal spot exchange rate ( . . , = ( ) − ( −1 ) );
denotes the logarithm of the forward exchange rate ( . . , = ( ) − ( −1 ) ); and +1
is an expectation forecast error. If the FX market is efficient, therefore, we should expect 0 to be insignificantly different from zero, while 1 should equal one. I estimate 1 during crisis and noncrisis periods to draw on the impact of financial crises on the efficiency of FX markets. [Insert Table 2 Here]
The main idea in the analysis is to check the size and the sign of 1 coefficient in Fama regression for individual currencies. For the whole sample period, the pooled regression of developed countries in Panel A shows that the forward premium is positively significant at 1% level (coefficient of 0.15958) and the intercept is insignificantly close to zero, while the pool of the developing market currencies is not predictable with the forward premium. Moving on to the sub-periods, the results show that the forward premium coefficient for the developed currencies pooled sample is significantly positive (0.191271) during the pre-crisis period, but it turns to significantly negative (-0.21413) during crisis period, before turning back to positive (0.102197) during the post-crisis period. For the pooled sample of developing currencies, the forward premium coefficient is positive during all three sub-periods but it is significant during the crisis period (0.02497). The results from the panel regression in the whole sample period thus give some support to the efficiency condition for the developed countries as compared to the developing countries.
However, financial crises seem to increase the efficiency of developing countries as compared to developed countries.
Moving on to the results from individual currencies in Panels B and C, the overall results confirm a widespread rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis for almost all the periods for all currencies, which is in line with most previous research. The forward premium coefficients are far from being one and carry little information, if any, for the expected spot rate changes, since all the forward premium coefficients are insignificant for all countries (except Australia, Argentina, Egypt, and Taiwan). Furthermore, 1 has the wrong sign in many cases. Most of the currencies from developed countries (6 of the 10 currencies) in Panel B show negative beta, while most of the currencies from developing countries (15 of the 20 currencies) in Panel C show positive beta.
Negative slope coefficients mean that currencies with higher than average interest rates tend to appreciate, not to depreciate as IRP would predict. Although this result is consistent with Poonawala and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) , it seems counterintuitive because it means that the forward puzzle is more prominent in developed countries.
Portfolio Analysis
If the forward rate fails as unbiased predictor for the spot exchange rate, then a profit opportunity is available and hence excess returns are possible, resulting in abnormal profits, an inherent characteristic of an inefficient market. Consider an example of an individual currency speculative strategy to define the excess currency returns. If the foreign currency is at forward discount (i.e., < ), currency traders long the foreign currency (or equivalently short the dollar) in the forward market in period , and then short the foreign currency (or equivalently long the dollar) in the spot market in period + 1. The net currency excess log returns dominated in dollars,( +1 ), thus equals the log forward rate minus the expected spot rate +1 . Alternatively, +1 can be measured as forward discount ( − ) minus the rate of the appreciation of the home currency (∆ +1 = +1 − ) 2 . Currency excess returns thus will be defined as 2 We measure the currency excess returns using forward markets. Alternatively, the excess return to investing in the carry trade while funded in USD can be measured also as the difference between the interest rate differential and the exchange rate changes, as follows: , * = ( * − ) − ∆ . The interest rate differential (i t * − i t ) is the interest rate difference between the foreign country and the U.S, where * is the foreign interest rate in units of foreign currency and is the nominal interest rate in US currency. As in Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan, 2011 and 2014 , the merit +1 = ( − ) − ∆ +1 = − +1 (3) Table 1 highlights some preliminary statistics of the currency excess returns in our sample countries. The daily excess returns for our pool of developed countries are positive (0.085% on average) during the pre-crisis period, that came from negative forward premium (-0.12% on average) and foreign currency appreciation (0.03% on average). The highest excess returns during this period are obtained by the Japanese yen, which yielded 0.42% daily.
The direct consequence of the failure of the FUH is the emergence of currency speculative trading strategies which has been a very popular speculative strategy for currency investors for more than three decades (Gagnon and Chaboud, 2007; Galati, Heath, and McGuire, 2007) . The lack of empirical support for the unbiasedness hypothesis was first evidenced by Fama (1984) , who show empirically that forward rates are generally biased predictors of future spot exchange rates because they predict depreciations of currencies trading at forward premium (i.e., there is a negative association between forward premiums and subsequent exchange rate returns). Carry trade strategies thus consist of trading in the forward market, betting that the foreign exchange rate will not change to offset the profits made on the forward premium or discount differential.
To measure the returns to the carry trade, I consider portfolio based carry trade strategies that go long in a portfolio of the highest forward premium (high interest rate currencies) and short in a portfolio of the lowest forward premium (low interest currencies). The merit of using a portfolio-based approach compared to using individual currencies is that I can eliminate to a large extent the currency specific idiosyncratic characteristics and, therefore, focus our attention on the non-currency specific characteristics. Several previous studies used the portfolio approach (e.g., of focusing our attention to investments in forward markets (compared to investment in interest rates) is that forward contracts are subject to low default risk. In addition, the data on forward exchange rates are easily available. Lustig and Verdelhan, 2007; Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan, 2011; Burnside, 2011; Rafferty, 2011; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Verdelhan, 2013) .
I implement these portfolio-based carry trades by sorting all the sample currencies into five portfolios based on their forward premium ( − ) against the USD, and then ranking them from small to large forward premiums. This procedure produces five currency portfolios, denoted as P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5. The 20% of countries with lowest forward premium are allocated to portfolio P1 (or equivalently the one with the lowest interest rate currencies), the next 20% to P2 and so on to portfolio P5 which contains the 20% of countries with the highest forward premium (or the one with the highest interest rate currencies). The carry trade strategy involves going long in a portfolio of the highest forward premium (high interest rate currencies) and shorting in a portfolio of the lowest forward premium (low interest currencies). Table 3 decomposes the average excess returns on each portfolio into its two components (i.e., excess returns equals forward premium minus spot exchange rate changes) for the five currency portfolios for the pooled samples of developed and developing country currencies in Panels A and B, respectively, and for all currencies in Panel C. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Lustig and Verdelhan, 2007; Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan, 2011; Burnside, 2011; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Verdelhan, 2013) , two patterns are observed. First, the average daily returns are almost monotonically increasing in the forward premium for all three pooled samples examined and over the full sample period as well as the three sub-sample periods. Further, the first portfolio P1 with lowest forward premium typically earns negative excess returns, while the last portfolio P5 with highest forward premium typically earns positive excess returns.
Like Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2009) , the HML carry trade strategy refers to longing P5 and shorting P1 (P5-P1). As Panel A indicates, the HML carry trade strategy had an average daily excess return of 0.0053, 0.00627, and 0.0037 over the pre-crisis, crisis, and postcrisis periods, respectively, for the pooled sample of developed countries. If I allocate currencies into portfolios using pooled sample of developing countries instead, the results in Panel B reveals a decreasing pattern in average excess returns of 0.0231, 0.0145, and 0.0126 over the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods, respectively. Although the HML portfolio for the pooled sample of developing countries (in Panel A) had larger average returns than the HML portfolio for the pooled sample of developed countries (in Panel B) over the crisis period, it is important to note that the average excess returns on the HML portfolio of developed (developing) countries increased (decreased) during the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Johansen Cointegration test
The unbiasedness of forward rates as predictor of future spot rates can also be tested with cointegration, which means that time series move together in the long run. The FX market efficiency condition in conjunction with rational expectations implies the existence of a cointegrating vector between the forward rates and the corresponding spot rates. If the spot and forward exchange rates are cointegrated, we can infer that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of future spot rate and, this finding, in turn, supports the within-country market efficiency.
I use two cointegration test statistics developed by Johansen (1991 Johansen ( , 1995 to examine FX market efficiency, which are the "trace statistic (λ-trace)" and the "maximum eigenvalue statistic (λ-max)". Both tests start with null hypothesis stating that the cointegrating rank among series equals zero ( . . , 0 : = 0), while the alternative hypothesis states that the cointegrating rank is greater than zero ( . . , 1 : > 0). If the first null hypothesis is rejected, both tests are performed sequentially so that the second null hypothesis states that the cointegrating rank among series equals one ( . . , 0 : = 1), while the alternative hypothesis states that the cointegrating rank is greater than one ( . . , 1 : > 1). This process is repeated until we fail to reject the null hypothesis and the final null hypothesis indicates the number of cointegrating rank. The two series are said to be cointegrated if there is one and only one cointegrating rank among the series, and thus, the FX market is said to be efficient. Table 4 shows the results of cointegration tests using both the trace test statistics (λ-trace) and the maximum eigenvalue test statistics (λ-max) for the whole sample period and the three subsample periods for developed and developing countries. Both the maximum eigenvalue and trace results in Table 4 provide consistent results by showing that the null hypothesis ( 0 : = 0) has been rejected at the 1% significance level in favor of the alternative hypothesis ( 1 : > 0) in all the sample currencies during the whole sample period. The results also show some evidence of co-integration rank greater than one ( > 1), albeit this is confined to a few cases only in the developing countries sample in Panel C. I thus conclude that there are at least one cointegrating vector between the forward rate and the corresponding future spot rate during the full period.
When the sample period is split into subsamples to examine the impact of the global financial crisis, our analysis show that forward rates and the corresponding future spot rates were more tightly cointegrated during the post-crisis period. The results in Panel A indicate that the null hypothesis of = 0 has been accepted during the crisis period for 5 of the 10 currencies from developed countries (DKK, DM/Euro, NZD, NOK, and GBP), albeit the results show strong evidence of co-integration rank greater than zero ( > 0) at the 1% significance level for these five currencies during the post-crisis period. A similar broad pattern emerges from developing countries. The results in Panel B show that there is no evidence of the existence of cointegrating vectors during the crisis period for 10 of the 20 currencies from developing countries (ARS, BRL, CLP, CZK, HUF, IDR, PTE, SGD, ZAR, THB) but they are strongly cointegrated during the postcrisis period. These results thus show that periods of high volatility, which is represented by the crisis sub-period, is rather an exception to the observation of cointegration between the forward rate and the corresponding future spot rate observed during the whole sample period and in time of tranquility, which is represented by the post-crisis period.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Efficiency Test (2): The Predictability Hypothesis
Most of the early work related to efficient markets was based on the random walk hypothesis, which says that successive price changes are serially uncorrelated and occur randomly. 
Unit Root Tests
The existence of a risk premium can make an efficient market appear to be inefficient if agents are risk averse. Fama (1984) argues that the forward bias may be caused by a time-varying risk premium that is priced in forward rates, which means that participants in the foreign exchange markets require a risk premium to compensate them for bearing the foreign exchange risk. Equation (1) can also be restated in logs so that the forward exchange rate equals to the future spot exchange rate plus a time-varying risk premium and a rational expectation forecast error
If we subtract the current log spot rate from both sides of equation, we find that the forward premium should equals to the future change in the spot exchange rate plus a time-varying risk premium and a rational expectation forecast error
Several studies (e.g., Crowder, 1994, and Newbold et al, 1998) tested the efficiency market hypothesis through examining the stationary nature of the forward premium. In this study, I
examine the stationarity of the forward premium during the three sub-sample periods using three popular unit root tests: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, Phillip-Perron (PP) test, and KPSS test. The null hypothesis in ADF and PP tests states that the series is nonstationary, while the null hypothesis in KPSS test states that the series is stationary. The risk premium implied by the forward premium must be stationary, i.e., I(0), for the market to be efficient, because this means that the foreign exchange market efficiently exploits all the available information, and the forward premium thus contains no information. Conversely, a non-stationary forward premium, i.e., I(1), implies that the FX market is not efficient since available information is not efficiently exploited and past values thus can predict future values. [Insert Table 5 Here]
Variance Ratio Test
The variance ratio test is another way of testing the randomness of exchange rate changes.
Of interest here is whether the exchange rate returns, as measured by the log differences of the rates, are martingale difference, or alternately, whether the exchange rates themselves follow an exponential random walk. The null hypothesis in the variance ratio test is that log spot exchange rate is a random walk, given that the value of the variance ratio statistic is one under the random walk hypothesis. Alternatively, a variance ratio of less (greater) than one implies negative (positive) serial correlation (i.e., mean reversion), indicating that the random walk hypothesis is rejected and thus suggesting that the foreign exchange market is inefficient. Table 6 presents the estimates of the variance ratio test statistics preformed on log spot rates for lags 2, 5, 10, and 30 for the full sample and the three sub-sample periods. For the whole period, there is no evidence to reject the random walk hypothesis for the developed markets, as none of the variance ratio statistics are significant at 5% level countries. This result is robust irrespective of whether the variance ratio statistics are calculated using pooled samples of The results also show that the New Taiwan dollar is the only currency in the entire sample that shows significant statistics at 1% level for all lags, and the magnitudes of the statistics for the New Taiwan dollar are the largest among the sample. This result indicate that the foreign exchange market of Taiwan is the least efficient among all the sample countries, according to the variance ratio test. This result is consistent with the one reported in Chiang et al. (2010) .
Moving on to the sub-periods, the results reveal that developed markets still follow a random walk behavior, given that the variance ratio statistics are insignificant for the pooled sample of developed countries in Panel A for all lags, and for almost all individual currencies in Panel B during the three sub-periods. A contrasting pattern, however, is observed for the developing countries. Panel A shows that the variance estimates for the pooled sample of developing countries are insignificant for lags 5, 10 and 30 in the pre-crisis period, but they become significant at 1% level in the crisis period and they increase as the lag increases, indicating that the currencies of developing countries on average follow a mean-aversion (positively serially correlated) behavior in the crisis period. Further, the results from individual currencies in Panel C
show that the variance ratio statistics are significant for eight currencies (Argentine Peso, Indian rupee, Indonesian Rupiah, Philippine Peso, Portuguese escudo/Euro, Russian Federation ruble, New Taiwan dollar, and Thai Baht) during the crisis sub-period although they were insignificant in the pre-crisis sub-period. The variance ratio statistics are also significant for the Egyptian Pound in both the pre-crisis and the crisis sub-sample periods.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
To sum up, the results from the unit root tests in the crisis period reveal that many currencies from both developed and developing markets become non-stationary, an interesting deviation from the random walk hypothesis, although they were stationary before the crisis. The results from the variance ratio test show that the random walk hypothesis is rejected also during the crisis period but only for the developing markets.
Since a conflicting result emerges, variance ratio tests results dictate for two reasons. First, many studies (e.g., Lee, Pan, and Liu, 2001 ) document that variance ratio test has far more power in detecting uncorrelated price changes than a unit root test. It is noteworthy that a unit root in forward premium does not necessarily imply randomness, given the fact that unit root tests only require the error term to follow a stationary process. Second, the results from the three unit root tests don not provide consistent results, but the results from the variance ratio test are robust irrespective the number of lags and whether pooled sample or individual currencies are examined.
To conclude this section, therefore, the findings from testing the predictability hypothesis suggest that the state of efficiency, as evidenced by the randomness of the FX rate changes, is adversely influenced by the financial crisis but only for developing foreign exchange markets.
Efficiency Test (3): The Profitability of Technical Trading Strategies
Another version of the EMH is referred as Informational Efficiency (Fama, 1984, Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994) , which states that a foreign exchange market is efficient if fully reflects all available information. A weaker-form, presented by Jensen (1978) , states that a market is efficient if there is no trading rule that relies on past prices generates statistically significant abnormal returns by exploiting the available information set.
Another way of testing FX market efficiency thus is examining the profitability of technical trading strategies. The rejection of the serial correlation version of the random walk hypothesis does not necessarily imply that the corresponding return predictability can be exploited economically. The evidence of weak-form market efficiency requires not only the unpredictability of price changes, but also the absence of abnormal returns using technical trading strategies (Jensen, 1978) .
The technical approach to investment is essentially a reflection of the idea that security prices move in trends of hopes, fears, knowledge, optimism and pessimism. Such trends persist for long periods because information that affects supply and demand does not come to the market at one point in time, but rather enters the market over a period of time. Therefore, technicians expect a gradual price adjustment to reflect the gradual flow of information, which causes trends in the security price movements. This philosophy is in sharp contrast to the EMH, which contends that past performance has no influence on future performance.
In this section, I test the FX market efficiency by examining the profitability of three common technical trading rules in the FX market, namely, simple moving averages (MA)
indicator, momentum (MOM) oscillator, and relative strength index (RSI). Starting with the MA trend-following trading strategy, an upward (downward) trend is usually identified when the current spot rate is greater (less) than the moving average. I measure first the daily simple moving average of the past spot exchange rate for the last 50 days ( . ., = 1 50
) for each currency pair, and then define buy and sell signals generated from the MA strategy, as follows
Similar to MA trading strategy, the Momentum trend-following oscillator measures the amount that the spot exchange rate for a currency has changed over a given time span. I calculate the momentum as a ratio of today's price of the spot exchange rate to the price 130 days ago, and then utilize the following buy and sell signals generated from the MOM trading strategy
Another popular technical trading strategy is the Relative Strength Index technical indicator, which focuses on total gain or loss in previous market days rather than prior price movements as the MA and MOM indicators. I first calculate the daily relative strength measured as the ratio of total average gains to total average losses ( = . . ⁄ )
for each currency pair. Average gains (losses) are calculated by totaling all the gains (losses) from the past 14 days and dividing by 14, where daily gain (loss) is determined if today's spot rate is higher (lower) than the previous day's spot rate. The RS is then converted to an index value that ranges between 0 and 100, using the following equation: = 100 − [100/(1 + ]. The RSI is a price-following oscillator that identifies two thresholds: the RSI bottoms below 30 indicating that the falling market trend is likely to reverse and thus suggesting a bullish signal, and tops above 70 indicating that the resistance level for the currency pair is near or has been reached and thus suggesting a bearish signal. The buy and sell signals generated from the RSI trading strategy are thus defined as follows
Under the null hypothesis of weak-form efficiency, no trading rule generates statistically significant excess profit. I use the buy and sell signals from the above three technical trading rules to test the FX market efficiency. Currency excess returns from each strategy are calculated as in equation 3 ( . ., +1 = − +1 ) during buy and sell periods. For completeness, currency returns will also be calculated for each strategy as the log spot exchange rate changes( . ., ∆ +1 = +1 − ).
Returns following buy signals
Under the null hypothesis of weak-form efficiency, there is no significant difference between excess returns from buy signals and excess returns from a buy-and-hold strategy. Table 7 shows the difference between the mean currency excess return in buy periods from the three technical trading rules and the unconditional mean of currency excess return for the full sample period and the three subsample periods. There are two major findings from Table 7 are worth noting. First, buy signals yield consistent results for both developed and developing countries over the full sample period and the pre-crisis sub-sample period. For the full sample period, MA and MOM strategies yield significant negative (losses) daily average excess returns for both pooled sample of currencies from developed and developing countries, while RSI strategy yield insignificant positive daily average excess returns for both pooled samples. In the pre-crisis period, the daily average excess returns following buy signals from all three technical trading rules are all negative for both developed and developing pooled samples. These results thus support the efficiency of FX markets over the full sample period and the pre-crisis period, given that technical trading rules are not able to outperform the benchmark buy-and-hold strategy.
Second, the results show that the global financial crisis had asymmetric effect on developed and developing markets. The daily average excess returns for the pooled sample of developed countries are negative and insignificant for all trading rules investigated over the pre-crisis and crisis sub-periods. Conversely, the mean returns for the pooled sample of developing countries become significantly positive at 1% level during the crisis period, given that the overall average daily Buy returns of 0.0014, 0.0018, and 0.0007 corresponds to the MA, MOM, and RSI, respectively. Furthermore, these mean returns remain also significantly positive during the postcrisis period. Thus I reject the null hypothesis of no difference between returns from Buy signals and returns from a buy-and-hold strategy for the developing countries over both crisis and postcrisis subsample periods.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
For completeness, Table 8 shows the difference between the mean exchange rate change rather than excess returns in buy periods from the three trading rules and the unconditional mean of currency excess return for the full sample period and the three subsample periods. The results from the panel analysis support the efficiency of FX markets over the full sample period and the pre-crisis period, given that all Buy signals are insignificant for the pooled samples of both developed and developing countries over the whole sample period and the pre-crisis sub-sample period. Over the crisis period for both pooled samples, only the MA trading strategy that yields positive significant returns while the RSI strategy yield negative significant returns.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Returns following sell signals
It is further hypothesized that under the null hypothesis of weak-form efficiency, there is no significant difference between returns from sell signals and returns from a buy-and-hold strategy. Table 9 Pound, Indian rupee, and New Taiwan dollar.
[Insert Table 9 Here] As a robustness test, Table 10 shows the difference between the mean exchange rate change in Sell periods from the three trading rules and the buy-and-hold mean of exchange rate return.
The results in Table 10 show patterns similar to those observed in Table 9 . The mean exchange rate returns in sell periods for the pooled sample of developed currencies in Panel A are almost zero and insignificant at 5% level for all trading rules examined over the full sample period and the three sub-sample periods, with the only exception being the mean returns generated from the MA strategy during the crisis period. All the mean returns following Sell signals from the three strategies are insignificant at any acceptable significance level in the pre-crisis period, but they become significantly positive (negative) at 1% level for the MOM and RSI (MA) over the crisis and the post-crisis sub-sample periods.
[Insert Table 10 Here]
Returns following buy-sell signals
Under the null hypothesis of weak-form efficiency, there is no difference between Buy period excess returns and Sell period excess returns from the three technical trading rules. In order to test this hypothesis, Table 11 presents the difference between the Buy and Sell period returns generated from the three technical trading rules. In the pre-crisis period, the buy-sell spread from all the three technical trading rules for both developed and developing pooled samples in Panel A is always negative that comes from consistent negative buy returns in Table 7 and positive sell returns in Table 9 for all trading rules investigated during the pre-crisis period. The results from the crisis period, however, show mixed results for the currencies from developed and developing countries. For the pooled sample of currencies from developed countries, the buy-sell spread generated from the three trading rules for the developed currencies pooled sample remain insignificantly negative during the crisis period that comes from negative buy returns in Table 7 and positive sell returns d in Table 9 for all trading rules investigated during the crisis period.
Conversely, the buy-sell spread for the pooled sample of currencies from developing countries becomes significantly positive at 1% level for both MA and MOM trading rules and remains significantly positive in the post-crisis period.
[Insert Table 11 Here]
To sum up, the results from testing the profitability hypothesis in this section can be summarized as follows. During pre-crisis period, the average mean returns by following both buy and sell signals are not different from the returns by following a buy-and-hold strategy for both developed and developing countries. During the crisis period, however, the global financial crisis had asymmetric effect on the profitability of technical trading rules on developed and developing FX markets. For the pooled sample of currencies from developed countries, the daily average excess returns following Buy (Sell) signals over the crisis period are insignificantly negative (positive) for all trading rules investigated, and these signals yield insignificantly negative buysell spread for the three trading rules during the crisis period. In contrast, the daily average excess returns following Buy (Sell) signals for the pooled sample of currencies from developed countries over the crisis period are insignificantly negative (positive) for all trading rules investigated. In contrast, several patterns are observed for the pooled sample of currencies from developing countries over both the crisis and post-crisis sub-sample periods. First, the buy signals are able to outperform the benchmark buy-and-hold strategy for all trading rules investigated during both crisis and post-crisis sub-sample periods. Further, daily average excess returns to trading based on Sell signals are only significant over the crisis and post-crisis sub-sample periods. In addition, the Buy-Sell spread is highly significant for all trading rules investigated. These results thus indicate that technical trading rules have significant forecasting power over both crisis and post-crisis subsample periods but only for developing countries. The existence of these abnormal returns in developing markets is an indication that the recent financial crisis led to inefficiencies in the FX developing markets, since a market is deemed efficient if none of the market players can earn these excess returns.
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that the state of FX market efficiency is influenced in high volatility regimes but only for developing markets. During periods of "booms" associated with high risk appetite and low volatility, foreign exchange markets (both developed and developing)
are mostly efficient. When the market conditions deteriorate, however, risk aversion increases and hence currencies from developed (developing) countries are viewed as safe-haven (risky)
currencies. Because of the changing risk perceptions in the wake of the turbulence in the global financial markets, FX developing markets are generally inefficient during times of tension as evidenced by both the rejection of the random walk hypothesis and the profitability of technical trading rules, whereas developing market efficiency hold when tested in the context of the forward unbiasedness hypothesis framework. This table presents descriptive statistics for 3 variables -forward premium, spot rate changes, and currency excess return -over the full sample period, and three subsample periods. The forward premium is measured as the log forward rate ( ) minus the log spot rate ( ). The spot exchange rate changes are measured as log returns (i. e., ∆s t+1 = log(S t+1 ) − log(S t )), where is the spot exchange rate of the foreign currency against the USD. The excess return is measured as the log forward rate ( ) minus the log one-month expected spot rate. This table shows the results for estimating the conventional Fama regression over the full sample period and the three subsample periods. The table presents the intercept and the beta coefficient from regressing the changes of spot exchange rate on the corresponding forward premium ( . . , ∆ +1 = 0 + 1 ( − ) + +1 ). If the FX market is efficient, 0 should be insignificantly different from zero, while 1 should equal one and significant. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A show the results for the three pooled samples. The first pooled sample includes all the 10 currencies from developed countries, the second pooled sample includes all the 20 currencies from developing countries, and the third pooled sample includes all the 30 currencies. Panel B shows the results for individual currencies from developed countries, and Panel C presents the results for individual currencies from developing countries. This table presents the statistics of two cointegration tests -the "trace statistic (λ-trace)" and the "maximum eigenvalue statistic (λ-max)". Both tests start with null hypothesis stating that the cointegrating rank among series equals zero ( . . , 0 : = 0), while the alternative hypothesis states that the cointegrating rank is greater than zero ( . . , 1 : > 0). If the first null hypothesis is rejected, both tests are performed sequentially so that the second null hypothesis states that the cointegrating rank among series equals one ( . . , 0 : = 1), while the alternative hypothesis states that the cointegrating rank is greater than one ( . . , 1 : > 1). This process is repeated until we fail to reject the null hypothesis and the final null hypothesis indicates the number of cointegrating rank. The two series are said to be cointegrated if there is one and only one cointegrating rank among the series, and thus, the FX market is said to be efficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A show the results for the three pooled samples. The first pooled sample includes all the 10 currencies from developed countries, the second pooled sample includes all the 20 currencies from developing countries, and the third pooled sample includes all the 30 currencies. This table presents the variance ratio estimates preformed on log spot rates for lags equal 2, 5, 10, and 30 days for the full sample and the three sub-sample periods. The null hypothesis in the variance ratio test is that log spot exchange rate follow a random walk behavior, and thus suggesting that the foreign exchange market is efficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A show the estimates for the three pooled samples. The first pooled sample includes all the 10 currencies from developed countries, the second pooled sample includes all the 20 currencies from developing countries, and the third pooled sample includes all the 30 currencies. Panel B shows the results for individual currencies from developed countries, and Panel C presents the results for individual currencies from developing countries. This table tests the null hypothesis that "Under the null hypothesis of weak-form efficiency, there is no significant difference between excess returns from Buy signals and excess returns from a buy-and-hold strategy". The figures in the table are the difference between the mean excess return generated from Buy signals based on three technical trading rules (namely, simple moving average (MA), momentum (MOM), and the relative strength index (RSI)) and the unconditional mean excess return based on a benchmark buy-and-hold strategy. Currency excess returns are calculated as follows +1 = − +1 for the full sample period and the three sub-sample periods. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A show the estimates for three pooled samples. The first pooled sample includes all the 10 currencies from developed countries, the second pooled sample includes all the 20 currencies from developing countries, and the third pooled sample includes all the 30 currencies. Panel B shows the results for individual currencies from developed countries, and Panel C presents the results for individual currencies from developing countries. This table provides a test of the null hypothesis that Buy period returns are equal to Sell period returns. Both Buy and Sell signals are generated based on three trading rules, namely simple moving average (MA), momentum (MOM), and the relative strength index (RSI). The performance of trading rules is investigated for the full sample period and the three sub-sample periods. The figures in the table are the difference between the buy and sell period excess returns, calculated as +1 = − +1 . *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A show the estimates for three pooled samples. The first pooled sample includes all the 10 currencies from developed countries, the second pooled sample includes all the 20 currencies from developing countries, and the third pooled sample includes all the 30 currencies. Panel B shows the results for individual currencies from developed countries, and Panel C presents the results for individual currencies from developing countries. 
